Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy [Arthur Ripstein] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. In this masterful work, both an. Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, Harvard UP, , pp., $ (hbk), ISBN Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is a major accomplishment; there is something to be learned from virtually every page. Ripstein’s goal is to reconstruct and.
|Genre:||Health and Food|
|Published (Last):||22 May 2016|
|PDF File Size:||15.3 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||12.68 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Persons and Bodies Japa Pallikkathayil 3.
Force and Freedom — Arthur Ripstein | Harvard University Press
Find it on Scholar. As Ripstein points out, this concept of freedom was not new amd Kant. Social and Political Philosophy. Whereas Locke allows a person to appropriate a thing subject only to the proviso that others are not made worse off, Kant freedoj that the formal character of right makes welfare considerations irrelevant, and the “mine or yours” structure of the right to things requires instead that any determinate and enforceable right of ownership requires a public or “omnilateral authorization” that cannot be found in a state of nature but becomes possible only in a “condition of right” or law-governed civil society, involving an authority empowered to act in the name of all p.
Freedom and Force
Coercion and the Grounds of Legal Obligation: It is purely formal in the sense that it concerns only your rightful claim to pursue whatever purposes you set through whatever actions you choose.
Ripstein argues for the Kantian thesis that rightfully sharing purposes with others is not possible merely through adding one person’s volition to another’s, but requires a “joining of wills” through mutual acts, each of which takes the other’s volitional act as an object p. Embodied Free Beings under Public Law: Chapter 1 is a general overview of Kant’s theory of law and justice.
The fact that Kant’s theory of right proceeds solely from the concept of right and the innate right to freedom, and not from any moral principle, does not entirely settle the vexed question of the relation between Kant’s “supreme principle of right” MS 6: So our conversation, which consisted mainly of youth listening to the superior wisdom of age, centered on the current state of Kant scholarship.
Chapter 11 discusses Kant’s notorious rejection of the right of revolution.
External Freedom in Kant’s Rechtslehre: The state may act only in ways consistent with each citizen’s innate right to freedom, but its duty to create and maintain a rightful condition involves powers that are “capacious and open-ended” and “does not preclude most of the familiar activities of modern states” p.
In addition to providing a clear and coherent statement of the most misunderstood of Kant’s ideas, Ripstein also shows that Kant’s views remain conceptually powerful and morally appealing today. Chapter 2 expounds Kant’s conception of the innate right of humanity. Google Books no proxy From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University’s proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy.
Ownership, as Ripstein emphasizes, has a “mine or yours” structure — involving the exclusion ffreedom others from the use of the thing pp. Please note that ebooks are subject to tax and the final price abd vary depending on your country of residence. Kantian external freedom is not a matter of advantage, welfare or other “material” considerations, and the innate equality it involves is not a matter of an equal distribution of any benefit.
Since then I have read many good books on Kant’s legal and political philosophy, many by people I know and respect one of them even based on a doctoral dissertation I supervised.
Request removal from index. Ripstein also argues that consent cannot be understood as a merely unilateral act, but always has the structure of an offer and an acceptance, requiring both parties to join their wills pp. Here he focuses anv on issues of the parental responsibilities for children, and avoids taking up the other applications Kant makes of this category, which most of us today would regard as indefensible, or at best only partly defensible. Nevertheless Ripstein does ably expound Kant’s theory of right in the way it ought to be expounded, and he gives thoughtful discussion of a wide range of issues from the authentically Kantian perspective on right and politics.
It also does not provide, in my view, a satisfactory interpretation ripdtein certain parts of it, such as punishment and international right. Edmundson – – Ethics 4: Giving Laws to Ourselves. This requires a “postulate” not independently demonstrable that a free person may take control of an external object in rightful pursuit of an end.
The innate right to freedom over your own body must be “extended” to things outside you. Lea Ypi – – European Journal of Philosophy 22 2: Ripsteln peace is unattainable because the only rightful forum for establishing it is voluntary and can be dissolved … A permanent congress of states has no resources to perpetuate itself, and any member is entitled to withdraw from it p. There is no space here to say why I regard this interpretation of Kant, though sympathetic and philosophically plausible, to be textually indefensible.
History of Western Philosophy. Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Chapter 6 turns to the need for a “rightful condition” or political state, and the role of legislation, executive power and the judiciary in constituting a state. Prominent themes include rights in the body, the relation between morality and law, the nature of coercion and its role in legal obligation, the role of indeterminacy in law, the nature and justification of political society and the theory of the state.
But I’m sorry that Gadamer, though he lived to the age ofstill did not live long enough to read it. Basic to this concept of freedom is being “your own master” sui jurisin contrast to being like a slave or serf subordinated to the will of another.
Mills – – Res Philosophica 95 1: Gadamer said that the biggest single lacuna in Kant studies was the absence of a really good book on Kant’s Rechtslehre. In that respect, I am more rpstein satisfied with this book. In Chapter 9, Ripstein argues at length that the Kantian state has wide powers and responsibilities when it comes to economic control and redistribution. Ripstein defends such a treatment of the case of Nazi Germany in some empirical detail, making a very persuasive case for this Kantian approach to it.
Ripstein also argues freecom on a Kantian account, “if illness and medical expenses regularly lead citizens to fall into conditions of dependency, a state can act proactively to provide publicly funded universal health care” p. Kate Moran – – Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 4: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophya seminal work on Kant’s thinking about law, which also treats many of the contemporary issues of legal and political philosophy.
Force and Freedom
He therefore emphasizes Kant’s rejection of private or religious charity, and his insistence that the poor should be provided for through taxation of the rich pp. He then cites Kant’s claim that the ripdtein of right enters “as a postulate that is incapable of further proof” MS 6: He was already over 70, and I was still in my twenties, having just published my first book on Kant. Chapters 7 and 8 emphasize the public and universal function of the law, and the fact that a condition of right requires certain forms of mandatory co-operation that could not, from a Kantian standpoint, be justified on any grounds of welfare or private benefit.
This would include not only protecting them from a condition of poverty that threatens their bodily survival a condition of free agency but also from relations of dependency on others. What Ripstein says there, however, seems to me unclear, perhaps even inconsistent. Sign in to use this feature. It emphasizes the interpersonal character of Kant’s neo- republican concept of freedom, and also the equality built into it as purely formal, in contrast to approaches that treat “equal” freedom as equal distribution of some benefit p.
Ripstein postpones to an Appendix his consideration of this very basic but also very difficult question.